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Figure 7.1 reproduces a version of  the first chart in Turning Sweden Around 
(Lindbeck et al. 1994). It shows two striking features of unemployment in Swe- 
den in the years after 1960. Until  1992, unemployment in Sweden remained 
persistently lower than in the average OECD country After 1992, it jumped to 
share  with  other  OECD  countries  a  high  recession  level.  This  situation 
prompted Assar Lindbeck and his coauthors to write: “During the 1970’s and 
1980’s, long-term unemployment became a serious  social problem  in most 
Western European countries. There is now an obvious risk that Sweden will 
go the same way. Although Sweden’s total unemployment, including people in 
various labor market programs, has recently reached European levels, long- 
term unemployment has not yet emerged. It should be an overriding task of 
economic policy to prevent creating a large group of permanently unemployed 
citizens-without  giving up the ambition of low inflation, an efficient use of 
economic resources, and satisfactory economic growth” (p. 6). 
Our work for the SNS-NBER project has aimed to help understand those 
two striking features of figure 7.1 and to offer insights about government poli- 
cies that promote or retard labor market efficiency and flexibility. We focused 
on three sets of  forces that can influence the level and average duration of 
unemployment:  (1) unemployment compensation programs,  (2) income tax 
schedules, and (3)  administrative procedures to prevent unemployed workers 
from abusing the unemployment compensation system. These forces moved in 
Sweden over the last thirty years in ways that help account for changes in the 
level and structure of unemployment. 
Lars Ljungqvist is professor of economics at the Stockholm School of Economics and a senior 
economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. Thomas J. Sargent is professor of economics 
at the University of  Chicago, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, and a 
research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
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Fig. 7.1  The unemployment rate in Sweden and the OECD average 
unemployment rate 
High and progressive tax systems tend to reduce the level of unemployment, 
but at a potential cost in terms of decreasing the efficiency of the labor market.’ 
Between the 1960s and the 1980s, tax wedges in Sweden increased dramati- 
cally, a movement that by itself should have helped keep the unemployment 
rate low (see fig. 7.2).  Between the 1960s and the 1980s, unemployment com- 
pensation became more generous (see fig. 7.3), which tended to increase the 
unemployment rate in Sweden. However, at least until very recently, in order 
to combat the adverse unemployment effects of generous unemployment com- 
pensation,  Sweden  supplemented  its  unemployment  compensation  system 
with a mechanism to monitor and coax unemployed workers into taking “ac- 
ceptable jobs.” The observed unemployment rate balances these forces. 
7.1  Summary of Findings 
We  interpret  the  persistently  low  Swedish unemployment  rate  from  the 
1960s through the 1980s as emerging from movements in our three counter- 
1. Pissarides (1983) was the first to emphasize the effects of higher tax rates in reducing the 
unemployment rate in a search model of unemployment. Mortensen (1986), Stigler (1961). and 
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Fig. 7.2  Time-series observations of tax wedges in Sweden 
Source: Gustafsson and Klevmarken (1993). 
Note; The solid line is the tax wedge for blue-collar workers. The dashed line is the tax wedge for 
white-collar workers. 
vailing  forces. In  their  effects  on the  unemployment  rate,  increases  in  tax 
wedges and progressivity tended to offset the increased generosity of unem- 
ployment insurance benefits. The monitoring program that supplemented the 
unemployment compensation system to safeguard it from abuse also helps us 
account for why unemployment in Sweden was as low in the 1980s as it was 
in the 1960s. We interpret the rise in unemployment after 1992 in terms of a 
relaxation of  that program in response to adverse macroeconomic shocks. In 
the absence of a resuscitation of that program, and unless unemployment bene- 
fit levels are reduced, Sweden is in danger of inviting persistently high levels 
of unemployment like those borne by other European countries in recent years. 
7.2  Two Views of Unemployment 
We analyze the juxtaposition of the forces described above with a quantita- 
tive model that incorporates aspects of two views about unemployment. One 
view, that too high an unemployment rate represents waste and inefficiency, 
was stated by Alan Blinder (1987,33) when he called unemployment the “big- 
gest inefficiency of them all.” The other view, that unemployed workers are not 302  Lars Ljungqvist and Thomas J. Sargent 
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Time-series  observations of average replacement ratios in Sweden  Fig. 7.3 
Source: Bjorklund and Holmlund (1991). 
Note: The solid line is the average replacement ratio for all unemployed workers. The dashed line 
is the average replacement among insured male blue-collar workers. 
just wasting time but are investing in useful information, was stated by George 
Stigler (1962,  104), who wrote: “From the social viewpoint, the return from 
investment in information consists in a more efficient allocation of  the labor 
force: the better informed the labor market, the closer each worker’s (marginal) 
product is to its maximum at any given time.” We need a quantitative model to 
evaluate  whether  the  unemployment  rate  is  too  high  (resources  are  being 
wasted in idleness) or too low (resources are being committed with too little 
information about alternative and superior uses). 
7.3  Overview of a Model 
Our analysis is based on a computer model of a labor market that we de- 
signed to imitate salient features of the Swedish labor market.* It is a version 
of the search model that Stigler recommended for labor markets. Search mod- 
els cast an unemployed worker as facing uncertainty about the wages that he 
can earn from different jobs and about the prospects that he will be offered a 
2. The technical details of the model are described in Ljungqvist and Sargent (1995a. 1995b). 303  Taxes and Subsidies in Swedish Unemployment 
job. Our model represents the labor market as consisting of a large number of 
workers, each of whom either does or does not have a job. We model each job 
situation as evolving over time in ways that often lead to “promotions”  but 
sometimes cause workers to be fired or to quit their jobs. In particular, at the 
beginning of each period, a worker is exposed to a small probability  that his 
job is destroyed, in which  case he enters the ranks of unemployed  workers 
whether he likes it or not. Also, at the beginning of each period  that a job 
continues, there is a small chance that the nature of the job will change. It may 
be upgraded or downgraded. Job reclassifications  confront workers with the 
choice of staying with a reclassified job or quitting and searching for a new 
job. Thus, job destructions and rejected reclassifications  are the immediate 
sources of unemployment. 
To find a job, an unemployed worker must search for one. Searching requires 
that the worker expend some effort or other resources. The potential reward 
for searching is finding a job offer. A job offer has some of the features of a 
financial option: it promises a particular stated pretax real wage so long as the 
job is not terminated or is not reclassified. When the worker accepts a job, he 
is accepting the bundle of  possible reclassifications  and terminations associ- 
ated with  it. Job offers-which  we summarize by  initial wage  offers-are 
from a probability distribution. This distribution helps determine the prospec- 
tive gains from further searching. The unemployed worker cares about the dis- 
persion of after-tax wages, which is affected by the tax system. 
An unemployed worker who has received  an offer to work at a particular 
wage balances the gains and losses from accepting the current offer. The gain 
is the after-tax wage that the worker will receive this period, plus the value 
to him of  starting next period with this job in hand. The loss comprises any 
unemployment benefits he would have qualified for and the prospective return 
from searching one more period and perhaps drawing a better job offer next 
period. The worker does best to accept the first offer that he receives that ex- 
ceeds a reservation wage. An unemployed person increases the likelihood that 
he will leave unemployment  by lowering his reservation  wage. The value of 
the reservation wage depends first on the level of unemployment benefits. In 
general, increases in the generosity of unemployment benefits cause the worker 
to increase his reservation  wage and to increase the expected duration of his 
unemployment. The value of the reservation  wage also depends on the after- 
tax distribution of wages that the worker faces. A decrease in the dispersion of 
the after-tax wage distribution  diminishes the rewards to search and thereby 
causes the worker to decrease his reservation wage and to decrease the average 
duration of his unemployment. 
Employed workers whose jobs have just been reclassified also set a reserva- 
tion wage for staying on the job. They face a choice similar to that of unem- 
ployed workers who have just received a new offer: they can accept the new 
offer or  else quit and enter unemployment. However, quitters are not eligible 
for unemployment  compensation  during the subsequent spell of  unemploy- 304  Lars Ljungqvist and Thomas J. Sargent 
ment. This means that potential quitters face a different potential gain from 
entering unemployment than do workers who qualify for unemployment com- 
pensation and that they choose a different reservation wage. 
Unemployed workers’ reservation wage policies determine a rate of transi- 
tion from the states of (involuntary and voluntary) unemployment to employ- 
ment.3 Employed workers’ reservation wages and the process for reclassifying 
jobs determine a rate of transition from employment to (voluntary) unemploy- 
ment. We also specify an exogenous rate  at which existing jobs are extin- 
guished, triggering an (involuntary) move to unemployment. These three tran- 
sition rates determine flows into and out of unemployment and enable us to 
calculate the unemployment rate that emerges from the experience of a large 
number of  workers. Any force that alters workers’ reservation  wages will in 
general alter the implied unemployment rate. 
The rule for administering unemployment benefits is one determinant of the 
reservation  wage  and  therefore  the  unemployment  rate.  We  use  a  one- 
parameter rule designed to capture in a simple way the spirit of the institution 
described by Bjorklund (1996, 177). “In order to receive unemployment com- 
pensation, the worker must be registered as a job seeker at the public employ- 
ment office, and an offer of  ‘suitable’ work must be accepted. If a ‘suitable’ 
offer is turned down, benefits can be denied for 4 weeks; further denials may 
occur if offers are repeatedly turned down. Manpower training programs may 
in some cases be regarded as ‘suitable’ work, and the same holds for temporary 
jobs (relief work) provided by the Labour Market Board. The disqualification 
rules also apply to workers who are dismissed for failure to perform their jobs 
and those who quit into unemployment.” We embody a version of this institu- 
tion by  specifying a “suitable wage” level, wg,  any offer above which must 
be accepted if an unemployed worker is to remain eligible for unemployment 
compensation. By lowering the parameter wg,  we tighten the rule. 
An important macroeconomic element of our model is a feedback loop from 
the level of general government expenditures and expenditures on unemploy- 
ment benefits to the tax rates borne by workers. This makes the tax rates in our 
model “endogenous,” meaning that, because they depend partly on the level of 
unemployment (which they in turn influence), they must be determined simul- 
taneously with the unemployment rate. 
The model captures Stigler’s notion of unemployment as being, at least in 
part,  a valuable  social  activity  of  information  gathering,  perhaps  even  one 
worth  subsidizing. By waiting,  unemployed  workers  are speculating  that  a 
more worthwhile job might come along. Inefficiencies can arise either because 
3. Our model distinguishes between two classes of unemployed workers, depending on whether 
they qualify for unemployment compensation. Involuntarily unemployed workers are those whose 
previous jobs were exogenously terminated. Voluntarily unemployed workers are those who quit 
their previous job after a reclassification plus those who have been disqualified from receiving 
unemployment compensation. In our simulations, we keep track of the numbers of both categories 
of unemployed workers because we have to compute the national bill for unemployment compen- 
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workers wait too long (the unemployment rate is too high, tending to make 
output lower than it could otherwise be) or because they wait for too short a 
time (the unemployment rate is too low, making output lower than it could be 
because workers are mismatched and work at lower-productivity jobs than they 
might hold). 
To judge whether an observed unemployment rate is too low or too high, we 
have to unravel the factors that create it. That is what our quantitative model 
is for. 
7.4  Numerical Experiments 
We used a computer to design experiments to tell us how different hypothet- 
ical settings of government policy variables would affect the level and structure 
of unemployment.  Below, we summarize the results of three sets of  experi- 
ments that focus on variations in (a)  the progressivity of the tax system, (b)  the 
level of unemployment  compensation, and (c)  the vigor with which the pro- 
gram to suppress  abuses of  the unemployment  compensation  system is en- 
forced. 
7.4.1  Effect of Taxes on Unemployment and Output 
Figures 7.4 and 7.5 report the effects of  unemployment  of  variations  in a 
parameter I, that  measures the progressivity  of  the tax system.  If  a worker 
receives a pretax wage of  w,  he pays taxes in the amount TW + .57 X max(w 
-  ZT,  0), where T is the base marginal tax rate, and IT is a wage level at which 
the marginal tax rate jumps up by 50 percent. In the range reported in figure 
7.4, increases in IT  correspond to decreasing the progressivity  of the tax sys- 
tem? Figure 7.4 shows how increases in progressivity of the tax system cause 
the unemployment  rate to decrease. Both voluntary  and involuntary compo- 
nents of unemployment decrease with increases in progressivity. 
These reductions in unemployment result from workers’ responses to the 
narrowing of the after-tax wage distribution caused by an increase in progressi- 
vity. A reductim in the dispersion of after-tax wages lowers the potential re- 
wards to further search, prompting workers to lower their reservations wages 
and on average to accept offers sooner. This causes the unemployment rate to 
fall. However, there is a social cost associated with this reduction in unemploy- 
ment, alluded to by Stigler in the passage quoted above. This cost is captured 
in figure 7.5, which shows the locus of unemployment-output pairs traced out 
as we vary the progressivity of the taxes, holding other parameters c~nstant.~ 
Increases in progressivity decrease both unemployment and output. This hap- 
pens because workers are accepting jobs at which their marginal products are 
4. This is because we have calibrated the mean of the distribution of  new wage offers to .5. As 
IT increases above .5, a larger and larger fraction of  workers do not pay the higher marginal tax 
rate on any part of their incomes and in effect just face a flat-rate tax of T. 
5. The adjusted GNP in fig. 7.5 refers to the economy’s output net of utility costs of  search. 306  Lars Ljungqvist and Thomas J. Sargent 
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Fig. 7.4  How unemployment rates vary as functions of the progressivity of the 
tax system, as measured (inversely) by I, 
Note:  The tax system becomes less progressive as I,  increases. The solid line is total unemploy- 
ment; the dashed line is voluntary unemployment. 
farther and farther from their “maximum” (in Stigler’s terms) as the tax system 
is made more and more progressive. 
In the next section, we describe how variations in unemployment compensa- 
tion can be used to offset the covariation of unemployment and output depicted 
in figure 7.5. 
7.4.2  Effects of Unemployment Compensation 
Figures 7.6 and 7.7 show effects of increasing the level of  unemployment 
compensation on unemployment and output. Increasing unemployment com- 
pensation drives up the total unemployment rate, even though it has a minor 
tendency to reduce the level of voluntary unemployment. (The reason that the 
voluntary unemployment rate goes down with an increase in unemployment 
benefits is that voluntarily unemployed workers do not receive benefits, but the 
tax rates of employed workers must go up to pay for the higher benefit levels. 
This diminishes the reward to workers to leave their jobs following reclassifi- 
cations.)  Figure  7.7  shows  how  increasing  unemployment  compensation 





Fig. 7.5  Relation between the total unemployment rate and adjusted GNP 
when varying I, as in fig. 7.4 
Note: The efficient unemployment, adjusted GNP pair is denoted by an asterisk (*). 
7.4.3  Effects of Monitoring the Unemployed 
Figure 7.8  shows how the unemployment rate varies with a parameter wg 
designed to capture the way  that the government administers unemployment 
compensation. If wage offers exceeding wg  are tendered and refused, it triggers 
termination of  unemployment benefits during the current spell of unemploy- 
ment. Thus, wg  parameterizes the unemployment compensation branch of the 
worker’s “option” in a particular way. We have calibrated things so that wg  = 
.55 represents quite a stringent policy and wg  2 .7 represents a very lax policy. 
Figure 7.8 shows how effective this policy is in reducing unemployment, even 
in the face of very generous unemployment compensation payments. 
We have “calibrated” the various parameters underlying figure 7.8 to match 
some key features of the Swedish labor market. In particular, we have set pa- 
rameters  governing  taxes  and  unemployment  compensation  to approximate 
their levels in Sweden in the 1980~~  At those levels of parameters, we find that 
setting a “tough”  (i.e., low) value for the administrative parameter w8  is im- 
6.  Figure 7.8 holds I, fixed at SO,  which corresponds to a very progressive tax system, and the 
unemployment compensation is set at a very generous level of  .55. 308  Lars Ljungqvist and Thomas J. Sargent 
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Fig. 7.6  Unemployment rates as functions of unemployment compensation 
Note: The  solid line is total unemployment; the dashed line is voluntary unemployment (ZT = SO). 
portant in holding down the level of unemployment. To match a comprehensive 
level of unemployment  of  around  .056  (this level counts people  in various 
training programs as unemployed and is more comprehensive than the concept 
reported in fig. 7.1 above), we find that we have to set wg  at a value of about 3. 
The dotted line in figure 7.8 shows the level of unemployment that would 
be efficient, in the sense that it maximizes the average rate of output. This rate 
(being the comprehensive measure) is about .089 and exceeds by about .03 the 
.056  rate of  unemployment  observed from the  1960s until  the  1980s. Our 
model imputes the excess of the efficient rate of unemployment over the aver- 
age rate of .056 observed to the particular Swedish constellation of income tax 
rates  and  structures, the unemployment compensation  rate, and the rules in 
place for administering unemployment compensation. 
To explore the effect of the administrative rules, figure 7.9 depicts the locus 
of unemployment, GNP pairs that would be associated with alternative levels 
of our administrative parameter wg.  Notice how far below the efficient point, 
depicted by an asterisk in figure 7.9, this locus lies. In figure 7.9, tightening 
(i.e., lowering) the administrative parameter wg  drives unemployment down and 
production up. 
Figure 7.8 asserts that the monitoring program supplementing unemploy- 309  Taxes and Subsidies in Swedish Unemployment 
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Fig. 7.7  Relation between the total unemployment rate and adjusted GNP 
when varying unemployment compensation, as in fig. 7.6 (I,  = SO) 
Note: The efficient unemployment rate, adjusted GNP pair is denoted by an asterisk (*). 
ment compensation was an important ingredient in delivering low unemploy- 
ment and that relaxing enforcement of that program could show up in much 
higher unemployment rates if  other government policies  were not adjusted. 
This “nightmare” is depicted in figure 7.10, where we posit a dashed line that 
depicts a “policy response” function that makes the seriousness of enforcement 
depend inversely on the aggregate unemployment rate. At low unemployment 
rates, a tough  enforcement policy  (low ws)  is easier to sustain than at high 
unemployment rates, which imparts a positive  slope to our policy response 
line.  This policy  response  function  generates  the  occurrence  of  “multiple 
equilibria”: in addition to the type of  low unemployment, strict enforcement 
pair discussed above, there is another lax enforcement, high unemployment 
equilibrium. The value of  the unemployment rate at the high-unemployment 
equilibrium matches up well with the .13 comprehensive unemployment ob- 
served in Sweden during 1993. 
The story embodied in figure 7.10 is capable of reconciling our explanation 
of the low unemployment  rates observed in the  1980s with the much higher 
unemployment rate observed after  1992. This occurrence is to be interpreted 
in terms of a jump from the low unemployment rate to the high unemployment 0.02  - 
---_-___--_--___-______  ---__  -----___ 
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Fig. 7.9  Relation between the total unemployment rate and adjusted GNP when 
varying w,,  as in fig. 7.8 (I,  = SO, and unemployment compensation is set at .55,) 
Note: Lower unemployment rates are associated with lower levels of w,. The efficient unemploy- 
ment rate, adjusted GNP pair is denoted by an asterisk (*). 311  Taxes and Subsidies in Swedish Unemployment 
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equilibrium,  a jump  occasioned  by  macroeconomics  shocks  outside  our 
model.’ 
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7.5  Other Aspects of the Computer Model 
Our model has other features that we trace out in Ljungqvist  and Sargent 
(1995a). 
1. We are able to calibrate separate 1960s and 1980s versions of the model, 
the first having less-progressive taxes and lower unemployment benefit levels, 
the second having more-progressive taxes and higher benefit levels. These cali- 
brations give realistic sets of tax wedges and replacement ratios for the two 
periods at the same unemployment rates for both periods. These calibrations 
are the foundation for our explanation of how offsetting forces accounted for 
the persistently low unemployment rate from the 1960s through the 1980s. 
2. Our calibrations  imply that, despite the stability of the unemployment 
rate from the 1960s to the 1980s, its structure should have changed. In particu- 
7. We  certainly do not regard the increase in unemployment after  1992 as the response to a 
spuntaneuus weakening of  the rules for qualifying for unemployment compensation. 312  Lars Ljungqvist and Thomas J. Sargent 
lar, our model implies that the new constellation of tax wedges and benefit 
levels that emerged in the  1980s should have led to a substantial  increase in 
the average duration of unemployment as well as to a reduction of  flows into 
and out of unemployment. Such changes in the structure of unemployment in 
Sweden have been observed between the 1960s and the 1980s. 
7.6  Relationship to Other Chapters 
In constructing our model, we have taken to heart and incorporated key con- 
clusions of Edin and Tope1 and of Forslund and Krueger (chaps. 4 and 6 in this 
volume, respectively), namely, that labor market programs have had at most a 
minor effect on the overall unemployment rate in Sweden. Our model embod- 
ies a stark version of their finding, by assigning no role to public expenditures 
on retraining and relief jobs.8 In our model, a government program does sup- 
press unemployment, but, instead of retraining and relief jobs, it is the adminis- 
trative  apparatus  for restraining  abuse  of  unemployment  compensation,  al- 
luded to in the above quotation from Anders Bjorklund. 
While we have not mentioned unions and central bargaining, any wage com- 
pression attributable to those institutions would serve to reinforce the mecha- 
nism that we have adduced to explain the low Swedish unemployment of the 
1980s. In our search model, anything that compresses the after-tax wage distri- 
bution-be  it a progressive income tax or pretax wages compressed through 
centralized bargaining-will  tend to lower the unemployment rate by dimin- 
ishing the rewards to search. 
7.7  Implications for Sweden 
A given level of the unemployment rate can be attained in various ways, 
from diverse packages of public policies and external circumstances. To inter- 
pret  or judge the  social desirability of  a given unemployment rate requires 
understanding the particular package of policies and circumstances that pro- 
duced it. We require a way to probe the composition of unemployment and to 
evaluate whether spells of unemployment and employment are too long or too 
short from the standpoint of the efficiency  of matching workers to suitably 
productive tasks. Our research has studied how aspects of public policy influ- 
ence workers’ incentives to modify those aspects of their behavior that deter- 
mine flows into and out of employment. 
We  attribute  the  persistently  low  Swedish  unemployment  rate  from  the 
1960s to the  1980s to a triumvirate of forces-high  and progressive  taxes, 
generous  unemployment  benefits,  and  administrative procedures  to prevent 
abuse of unemployment  compensation-that  excludes  Swedish government 
8. A very minor macroeconomic role surfaces in their effects on equilibrium tax rates through 
the government budget constraint. 313  Taxes and Subsidies in Swedish Unemployment 
expenditures on labor market policies such as relief jobs and retraining. We 
are able to account for the level of the Swedish unemployment rate in the 1960s 
and  1980s while ignoring those expenditures. In our view, the administrative 
procedures’  successful containment  of “abuse” of unemployment compensa- 
tion  coalesced  with  lower job mobility  emerging from higher  income tax 
wedges to sustain a low unemployment rate. But the unemployment rate was 
suppressed by accepting the cost of a less-efficient labor market, symptomized 
by increased duration of unemployment. 
Our analysis  asserts  that  the  changes in  the structure  of  unemployment 
between  the  1960s and the  1980s signified increasing  labor market distort- 
ions. The increase  in the average duration  of  unemployment  spells and the 
lower flow of workers into unemployment can be explained by the increased 
progressivity of the tax system and more generous unemployment compensa- 
tion of the 1980s. A less efficient labor market harmed the performance of the 
Swedish economy during the last fifteen years. Lindbeck et al. (1994) describe 
the slowdown in productivity growth that has sent Sweden from third to four- 
teenth place among OECD countries in terms of per capita GDP. 
Our analysis raises apprehensions  about Sweden’s ability to cope with its 
present high unemployment rate. If, as seems likely, the administrative proce- 
dure  for  monitoring  unemployment  compensation-the  system’s  dike- 
breaks down at high unemployment rates, then our analysis predicts persis- 
tently high unemployment rates. In the absence of effective administrative con- 
trols, our analysis suggests that the way to diminish such structural unemploy- 
ment is to lower unemployment compensation benefits. 
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